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If an account of United Nations peacekeeping
operations in Croatia were to be written, the United
Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern
Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES)
would be its denouement. UNTAES, the third suc-
cessive peacekeeeping mission on Croatian territory,
was the one in which the lessons progressively learned
by both the United Nations and Croatia brought an
appropriate closure to the story. A specific, and per-
haps unique, mix of elements contributed to the ulti-
mate success of UNTAES.' The key elements were;
an achievable mandate, international support for the
fulfilment of the mandate, domestic leadership and
forbearance, adept and pragmatic leadership of the
mission and the existence of a balance of power in the
region conducive to the mandate's implementation.
small number of non Serbs who remained in the occu-
pied areas of Croatia that came to be under the protec-
tion of United Nations forces continued to suffer. Esti-
mates vary, however, there are indications that about
600 persons were killed and several thousand were
displaced by the occupying forces during this period."
Therefore, it is clear that the United Nations troops, who
were met in Croatia with extremely high and probably
unrealistic expectations, were unable to achieve the tasks
that they were assigned. This, should not, of course, be
regarded as a criticism of the troops themselves. It is
important to understand that the forces were equally frus-
trated with the lack of progress in their mission.
The serious difficulty with UNPROFOR, and
afterwards UNCRO, was that their political basis was
ambiguous. Both missions had it built into their man-
dates that they were an "in-
terim arrangement" to create
the conditions for a settle-
ment. The UNPROFOR
mandate, being the first in
time, was the most ambigu-
ous stating that " ...the Force
should be an interim arrange-
ment to create the conditions
of peace and security required
for the negotiation of an over-
all settlement of the Yugoslav
crisis."? The UNCRO man-
date represented slightly
more favorable wording for
Croatia stating that it was an
" ...interim arrangement that
will facilitate a negotiated
settlement consistent with the
territorial integrity of the Re-
public of Croatia .."6 Upon
the insistence of Croatia, the
mandate ofUNCRO was bol-
stered in comparison to
UNPROFOR the authority to
control Croatia's interna-
tional borders within the oc-
cupied areas and to facilitate
economic cooperation being
added.' Nevertheless, the in-
transigence of the rebel lead-
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The trials and errors
of the peacekeeping opera-
tion in Croatia that came
prior to UNTAES, namely
the United Nations Protec-
tion Force (UNPROFOR)
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fidence Restoration Opera-
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provided case studies for
what had been lacking and,
by corollary, what was re-
quired in order to succeed.'
Both of these earlier mis-
sions suffered the ignomini-
ous end of being legislated
out of existence. 3 During the
course of the UNPROFOR
and UNCRO mandates the
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ership ensured that no resolution could be attained.
The ambiguous nature of the UNTAES and latter the
UNCRO mandate had its source in the Vance Plan",
which was the United Nations plan for dealing with
the occupied areas in Croatia, prepared by Cyrus Vance.
The key elements of the Vance Plan were the reloca-
tion of the Yugoslav People's Army, the demilitarisation
of the United Nations Protected Areas, the return of
refugees and displaced persons and the continuation
of the functioning of the local administration and po-
lice forces pending a political solution.
Aside from the nominal withdrawal of Yugoslav
People's Army troops, none ofthe other elements were
implemented. As has been indicated, the process of
displacing and, in many instances, murdering non Serbs
within the occupied territories continued unabated. By
mid 1994, according to Government estimates, only
194,000 of the pre-war population of about 550,000
(of which 287,830 had been Serbs and 261,253 non-
Serbs) remained in the occupied areas. Of this figure
of 194,000, only 10,000 were non-Serbs.? In these cir-
cumstances, the predictable failure to arrive at a politi-
cal solution proved to be the major hindrance to the
implementation of any aspect of the mandate.
The unattainable "political solution", which was
enshrined in the Vance Plan as a core "General Prin-
ciple'"? proved itself to be an altogether inappropriate
element for a United Nations peacekeeping operation.
Its effect upon the mandate was the interpretation that
UNPROFOR was to be implemented pending a "po-
litical solution". This uncertainty had a deeply nega-
tive impact upon the mission, casting a shadow over
the political future of the area and leaving the peace-
keepers with the thankless task of working within the
vacuum of what the variously interpreted "political
solution" should be. Aside from the effect of this situ-
ation upon those on the ground, various divisions
among Security Council members were also manifested
in consequence of this ambiguity, hence influencing
the international aspect of the peacekeeping operation.
It is not misplaced to suggest that in spite of their rec-
ognition of the Republic of Croatia, some international
actors had fluid policies regarding the ultimate resolu-
tion of the conflict and Croatia's territorial integrity.
Those who were not sympathetic towards Croatia's
plight used the political uncertainty of the duration of
the presence of UNPROFOR to encourage inaction.
Finally, the fact that there was an inbuilt political am-
biguity also heavily influenced the behavior of the sides
on the ground, both the Government and the rebel lead-
ership.
UNTAES as a Success Story
The arrival ofUNTAES came within a differ-
ent political setting to that of predecessor missions.
After successful Croatian military operations in May
and August 1995, Eastern Slavonia remained the only
part of Croatia not yet under Government control.
Parallel to this and heavily influenced by the Dayton
peace talks, the Basic Agreement on Eastern Slavonia,
Baranja and Western Sirmium between the Croatian
Government and the rebel Serb authorities was con-
cluded, envisaging the peaceful reintegration of the
region." Finally, it was clear to all the major interna-
tional actors that the Danube region was a constitu-
tive part of Croatia and that to maintain otherwise
would lead to the renewal of hostilities. The rebel
authorities in the region accepted this fact, not only
because ofthe Agreement, but because the reality on
the ground had changed since the time ofUNPROFOR
and UNCRO. The change in the balance of power,
which had arisen as a consequence of the strengthen-
ing of Croatia's military capacity, made it quite clear
that if Eastern Slavonia could not be reintegrated into
Croatia by means of diplomacy and negotiations it
would be retaken militarily.
UNTAES was created, therefore, in what was
an environment favourable for its ultimate success.
This environment was first demonstrated in the Ba-
sic Agreement and subsequently in the clearly de-
fined mandate of the mission. The Basic Agreement
sought the formation of a transitional authority which
would oversee the peaceful reintegration of the re-
gion into the legal and constitutional system of
Croatia. The Agreement was the key forerunner to
the entire reintegration process that would subse-
quently develop through the United Nations.
At the time of the adoption of Security Coun-
cil resolution 1037 (1995) the Croatian representa-
tive at the meeting cited the Secretary General's re-
port of 13 December 199512 which set as the objec-
tive of UNTAES the achievement of " ...a peaceful
reintegration of the region into the Croatian constitu-
tional system through the implementation of the ba-
sic agreement". He added that the Government un-
derstood that the resolution went beyond the passive
protection of Croatia's territorial integrity within its
internationally recognized borders to the active res-
toration, through the Transitional Authority, of the
region to Croatian sovereignty." This was in stark
contrast to the UNPROFOR and UNCRO mandates.
Significantly, recourse to the military option
was unhelpful to all the interested parties: the Fed-
eral Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), the Government
of Croatia, and the rebel Serbs. Importantly, it was
also evident from the points of view of the Contact
Group and Security Council that they had grasped the
window of opportunity created by the Croatian mili-
tary successes and hence supported a solution involv-
ing a transition period as the most favorable for all
parties. Crucially, therefore, there was a confluence
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of the interests, if not the underlying motivations, of
the parties.
For the FRY, choosing once more to militarily
assist the rebel Serbs in the Danube region meant it
would be faced with a large scale war in which the
prospects for success were, at best, unclear. On the
other hand not intervening in the case of a Croatian
military action would have increased the possibility
of the influx of a large number of refugees with the
potential for destabil izing the Milosevic regime." In
these circumstances, a peaceful transition of control
in Eastern Siavonia seemed a reasonable solution. The
psychological situation in Croatia, as reflected by
the Government, was that, after facing aggression,
ethnic cleansing, much frustration and five years of
waiting, it was time to re-assume control over the ter-
ritory ofthe Danube region. However, it was also well
understood that ifmilitary means were to be used, the
losses would be substantial. It would not only result
in a direct loss in terms of human lives and material
losses. It would also be reflected in the loss of the
possibility of cooperation with the Croatian Serbs and
the Serbs from the FRY for the foreseeable future. In
light of these factors Croatia opted for a long-term
solution. This involved the negotiation with FRY of
an agreement on normalization of relations and, in
that way, improving the prospects for a more rapid
advance towards the European integration processes,
and the Partnership for Peace. Croatia was prepared,
therefore, to wait a little longer in the interest of re-
gional peace and stability, but also for the achieve-
ment of its national goals in a sustainable manner.
From the view point of the rebel Serbs, the
realization that their hope of carving out a portion of
Croatia and annexing it to FRY was forlorn left them
in an inherently insecure situation in which the status
quo from the pre-existing period of occupation was
untenable. Eastern Slavonia could not exist alone, it
required the re-establishment of the links severed with
Croatia. In this context, the altered regional balance
of power and the silence emanating from FRY were
important elements. In these circumstances, it became
quite clear that the territory of Eastern Slavonia would
be reintegrated into Croatia. This inevitability gave
rise to fear of reprisals. Bearing all of this in mind,
and noting that the rebel Serbs in Eastern Slavonia
lacked a genuine democratic leadership and any sys-
tem of law and order, they ultimately welcomed the
arrival of the UNTAES, for it filled a void in which
anarchy was the predominant condition. Tnaddition,
the rebel Serbs felt that they had been betrayed by
FRY. They were incited to rebel against Croatia, they
were promised that they would become part of FRY
and then, in the end, the political game ended differ-
ently and they were left isolated. In these circum-
stances, they relied heavily on UNTAES, particularly
as an intermediary in the reconciliation process be-
tween themselves and the Croatian Government and
also in the reconciliation at a local level with people
of Croatian origin or other non-Serbian origin who
would return and resettle in the area.
The overall picture, therefore, was that the op-
eration had genuine political support within the Se-
curity Council and Contact Group and among the
groups who were actually engaged on the ground.
However, whilst there was an evident confluence of
interests in terms of the presence of the mission, there
were different interests in respect of the process and
modalities. The interest of the Government was to
expedite the process. On the other hand, the interest
of the rebel Serbs was to prolong it with a view to
achieving some additional special status or avoiding
full reintegration altogether. This provided the Tran-
sitional Administrators with a powerful tool for sua-
sion which they came to be adept at employing. The
Transitional Administrators were quite explicit when
communicating with the Government, suggesting, for
example, that to expedite reintegration it ought to take
additional measures such as the allocation of more
resources or better co-operation. In fact, what the
Croatian Government accepted was that if it wanted
speed it had fully to cooperate with U TAES in re-
gard to the equality of all Croatian citizens and it had
to take steps towards reconciliation, in spite of the
freshness of the scars of war. On the other hand, in
dealing with local Serbs the ultimate threat was the
suggestion them that if they did not cooperate,
UNTAES would simply leave. This was a very pow-
erful tool and one of the keys for ultimate success.
The process of reintegration was, of course,
more than merely politically challenging. 11repre-
sented major technical difficulties for the civil ian as-
pects ofthe reintegration. These challenges arose from
the period of occupation during which there had been
a prolonged and deliberate process of severing all pre-
vious administrative and infrastructural links to
Croatia. In practical terms this meant that the police,
local government, financial and monetary systems,
social security and health and education systems, the
judicial system, utilities, communications and all
manner of other systems had to be reintegrated. In
this process, the Transitional Authority was single-
minded and meticulous and the Government, in spite
of the significant financial burden that this represented,
was similarly diligent.
The civilian aspect of the reintegration was
undertaken, as were the other elements, according to
a strict timetable. In this regard, the Government's
documents program was a key component in provid-
ing the local residents with the necessary documen-
tation for participation in Croatian society, from docu-
ments evidencing Croatian citizenship and identifi-
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cation cards to drivers' licenses. The documents pro-
gram involved a large logistical commitment to ser-
vice the needs of the Croatian citizens in the region.
The Government met this challenge by setting up 23
offices for the receipt of applications and dispensa-
tion of documents in the region involving more than
120 civil servants who travelled daily from the re-
gional centres of Osijek and Vinkovci in spite of nu-
merous security problems. Although the work of the
Government offices was primarily directed to the is-
suance of documents for the purposes of participa-
tion in the nation-wide local elections held in early
1997, work continued and by the time of the termina-
tion of the UNTAES mandate 198,159 excerpts from
registrar books and books of citizenship had been is-
sued, including 154,443 certificates of citizenship. IS
Another important aspect of peaceful reinte-
gration was demilitarization and the weapons buy-
back scheme. This latter scheme has been recently
discussed in a study prepared by the former Deputy
Transitional Administrator of the region. 16 In the in-
novative Firearms Buy-Back Program, which lasted
approximately 10 months and was jointly conducted
by the Government and UNTAES, 9,680 firearms were
collected, as well as 45,246 explosive arms and
2,325,378 rounds of ammunition and ignition devices
and 106.16 kg of explosives, for which 10,700,000
kuna were paid."
UNTAES was concluded on 15 January 1998,
the maximum period for its operation envisaged un-
der the Basic Agreement, with the withdrawal of the
final peacekeepers and the complete hand over of
executive control over the region to the Government.
In fact, during the last few months of the process the
number of peacekeepers had been scaled down sub-
stantially from the 5,000 initially present. As the tran-
sition period proceeded an increasing number of se-
curity functions were performed by the Transitional
Police Force (TPF) which was made up of 40% each
of Croats and Serbs and 20% of other ethnic groups
present in the region. Initially under the responsibil-
ity ofUNTAES, the TPF latter came under the man-
agement of the Ministry for the Interior one year prior
to complete reintegration of the region.
Remaining Problems in Eastern Slavonia
The conclusion of the mandate left some mat-
ters which required the passage of time and resources
for their ultimate resolution. Most important among
them were reconciliation, return and economic recov-
ery.
Reconciliation, is clearly a long-term process.
In this regard, cooperation between UNTAES and the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugo-
slavia was a very important element. A part of recon-
ciliation involves the establishment ofthe truth about
what occurred in the area, that is, of the establish-
ment of the individual responsibility of those who
committed war crimes. Whilst it is always the case in
active hostilities that crimes are committed by all sides,
nevertheless, a framework needs to be delineated as
to what occurred, why it was wrong and has to be
punished. In that respect, the arrest of Slavko
Dokrnanovic, the former rebel Serb mayor ofYukovar,
indicted for his involvement in war crimes, was ex-
tremely valuable not only from the point of view of
the credibility ofthe international community, but also
for reconciliation. Unfortunately, his suicide prior to
the end of his trial prevented the passing of sentence
and the positive impact that such an occurrence would
have had.
It is indeed a problem that there has been a lack
of cooperation by FRY on the indictments issued in
respect of Mrksic, Sljivancanin and Radic, all senior
Yugoslav army officers, who were involved in the most
horrendous war crimes in Vukovar. The trial of these
individuals is very important for reconciliation in the
area. It would clearly indicate that what was going on
in Eastern Slavonia was, to quite an extent, brought
into the area or imposed upon it, rather than having
any deep roots there. In this context, the single arrest
of Dokmanovic, who was from the area, might be
misleading when placed in the perspective of where
the destruction ofVukovar was instigated from. Nev-
ertheless, one can remain reasonably optimistic con-
cerning reconciliation over the long term.
In early October 1997, in cooperation with the
international community, the Government launched
its Program for the Establishment of Trust, Acceler-
ated Return, and Normalization of Living Conditions
in the War Affected Regions of the Republic of
Croatia. The program's implementation has led to the
creation of Trust Establishment Committees from the
national through to the local level. The appointment
of a senior presidential adviser as chairperson of the
national committee has added weight to the imple-
mentation of the program. Much will depend upon
the role of the media. Just as it played a negative role
by inciting ethnic rebellion and intolerance, it can also
be used in the process of reconciliation.
The UNTAES mandate included the facilita-
tion of return of refugees and displaced persons. 18 In
that respect UNTAES achieved relatively little. How-
ever, blame should not be laid at the feet ofUNTAES
but rather upon the particularly difficult psychologi-
cal and economic situation which continues to face
people from the area. As of May 1998, about 15,000
Croats have returned to the region of the approxi-
mately 80,00019 who were forced to leave. On the other
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hand, 37,00020Croatian Serbs have returned to vari-
ous parts of Croatia, either from Eastern Slavonia
where they were living as displaced persons to other
parts of Croatia where they previously lived or from
FRY or third countries. Whilst not large, the numbers
are significant. At the same time, the desire to return
is checked by the lack of economic opportunity nec-
essary to make such return sustainable.
In regard to the return process, the Government
has proclaimed the unequivocal right of return of all
its citizens through three documents, namely the Pro-
cedures for the Individual Return of Persons Who
Have Left Croatia, Mandatory Instructions concern-
ing the implementation of Procedures for Individual
Return, as well as, the Program for Return and Ac-
commodation of Displaced Persons, Refugees and
Exiled Persons. Each of these documents, which in-
stitutionalize accepted international norms, were pre-
pared in cooperation with the international commu-
nity. The return process is continuing and is complex,
requiring perseverance on the part of returnees who
have already been displaced from their homes for
many years,
Finally, there remains, the issue of economic
recovery. It is a difficult matter which is more than
anything else a question of the investment of resources.
A rough estimate of the amount expended upon peace-
keeping operations solely upon the territory of Croatia,
is about $US5 billion. If, in this connection, one con-
siders that the greatest obstacle to reconstruction and
economic recovery is resources, then it becomes evi-
dent that a disproportionately smaller amount would
be required to create an economic impetus and a more
positive disposition towards the future in the region.
The Conference on Reconstruction and Development
held in Zagreb in December 1998 showed that while
the international community had good will the re-
quired funding failed to materialise in the quantity
required. The total pledges of $US25 million repre-
sented 1% of the amount estimated as being neces-
sary for reconstruction.
In conclusion, UNTAES can be assessed as very
successful peacekeeping operation. The expiration of
its mandate was followed, at the invitation of the
Government, by the single term United Nations Ci-
vilian Police Support Group whose function was to
continue the important confidence building function
of monitoring the performance of the Croatian po-
lice, particularly in relation to the return of displaced
persons and refugees." Following the conclusion of
the mandate of the Police Support Group, monitoring
was handed over to the Organisation for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)22on October 16, 1998
with a substantially similar mandate, which is still
continuing. However, although the importance of con-
fidence building cannot be doubted, in the long run,
success will be heavily reliant upon resources. With-
out the economic recovery of the area, formerly one
of the most prosperous in Croatia, Croats will never
return in significant numbers, while the Serbs will
continue to leave. •
1 In his report to the Security Council of 4 December 1997 the
Secretary General observed that with the approaching conclu-
sion of the transitional administration period envisaged in the
Basic Agreement (AJ50/757) of 15 November 1995 there was
consensus that UNTAES had successfully achieved the basic
objectives for which it was established.
2 For an analysis of the performance of UNPROFOR and
UNTAES see "Croatian International Relations Review", Vol. 1.
No.1, 1995, Dossier' UN on Croatia, pp. 1-5.
3 The progressive termination of UNPROFOR activities in Croatia
was put into operation by Security Council resolution 982 (1995).
The UNCRO mission was terminated by Security Council reso-
lution 1025 (1995).
4 Nikic, Gorazd (ed.), Croatia Between Aggression and Peace,
AGM, 1994, Zagreb, p. 70.
5 Security Council resolution 743 (1992), o.p. 5.
6 Security Council resolution 981 (1995), o.p. 5.
7 Ibid, operative paragraph 3.
8 Ramchan, B.G. (ed.), the International Conference on the
Former Yugoslavia, Official Papers, Vol 1, Kluwer Law Interna-
tional, The Hague, p. 447
9 Ibid 4.
101bid7.
11 The Basic Agreement AJ57/757 was concluded between the




13 S/PV. 3619, Verbatim record of the 2619th meeting of the
Security Council on 15 January 1996.
14 Holbrooke Richard, "To End a War", Random House, New
York, 1998, p. 249.
15 Report on the Implementation of the Letter of Intent by the
Government of the Republic of Croatia on Peaceful Reintegra-
tion of the Croatian Danube Region and the Establishment of
the Legal and Constitutional Order in the Areas of the Counties
of Osijek-Baranja and Vukovar-Srijem, September 22, 1997.
16 Boothby, Derek, "The UNTAES Experience: weapons buy-
back in Siavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (Croatia)", Bonn
International Centre for Conversion, October 1998.
17 Ibid, 16.
18 Security Council resolution 1037 (1996). o.p. 11(d).
19 Croatian Government Office for Displaced Persons and Refu-
gees.
20 Ibid.
21 The UNPSG was authorised by Security Council resolution
1145 (1997) on December 19,1997.
22 The UNPSG and the OSCE established a Joint Steering
Committee to oversee the transition of monitoring from one or-
ganization to the other.
9
